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Abstract. One area of public policy where rent-seeking and favoritism is relatively com-
mon is the contracting out of public services. Private firms can improve their chances of 
obtaining contracts by bribing politicians or public servants and funding political parties. 
In the same vein, firms can gain access to policymakers by hiring influential former politi-
cians –a practice commonly referred to as revolving-doors. In this paper, we use information 
from 922 privatizations of water services in Spanish municipalities between 1984 and 2016 
and multinomial logistic regression techniques to study the association between specific 
firms securing contracts and the political parties ruling the municipalities. We find robust 
statistical evidence of an association between the Popular Party (Partido Popular or PP) and 
the firm Aqualia, part of the large Spanish holding company Fomento de Construcciones y 
Contratas (FCC), which is known to have funded the Popular Party. Furthermore, former 
PP politicians have been appointed to top positions in the FCC Board of Directors. How-
ever, this relationship weakened after the institutional reform of 2007 on public procure-
ment and financing of political parties, which is empirically evaluated in this paper. 
Keywords. Rent-seeking; political connections; privatization; urban water services; Spain. 
JEL Classification. D73; L33; L95. 
Highlights. 
 Favoritism is relatively common in contracting out public services 
 We find political connections in contracting out water services in Spain 
 Political connections were weakened with some regulatory reforms in 2007 
 More regulatory and institutional reforms are needed in Spain to further weaken 
political connections 
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WEAKENING POLITICAL CONNECTIONS BY MEANS OF REGULATORY REFORM: 
EVIDENCE FROM CONTRACTING OUT WATER SERVICES IN SPAIN 
1. Introduction and background 
The study of rent-seeking has long been a key element in the analysis of the motivations of 
governments’ decisions. Rent-seeking has been defined as ‘…The quest for privileged benefits 
from government’ (Aidt, 2016:144). According to Lambsdorff (2002:101), the focus of rent-
seeking is on the interaction between the state and private parties, where the government 
has the monopoly on allocating property rights. The study of how individuals or firms can 
benefit from political influence and connections has received attention in the field of eco-
nomics, ever since the seminal papers of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976). In particular, 
Stigler (1971) discussed financial support for electoral campaigns, and funding for the bu-
reaucratic tasks of the political party machinery as potential demands that governing par-
ties can make in exchange for regulation in favor of specific industries or firms. In recent 
years, there has been an accumulation of empirical evidence on the existence of strong, mu-
tually beneficial linkages between firms and politicians (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Akin et al., 
2016; Faccio et al., 2006). 
One of the fields most closely linked to political rent-seeking and favoritism is that of pri-
vatization of public services (Hart et al., 1997). In this context, rent-seeking may occur when 
a company secures public service contracts in exchange for financial donations or board 
positions, among others. Empirical evidence on the relationship between political connec-
tions and financial donations, and the allocation of procurement contracts has been pro-
vided for different levels of government: federal (Boas et al., 2014; Goldman et al., 2013; 
Witko, 2011) as well as local (Amore & Bennedsen, 2013). This practice is contrary to the 
public interest, because it does not guarantee that the best-performing company is awarded 
the contract. This is therefore likely to lead to inefficiency (Dal Bó & Rossi, 2007), lower 
service quality and extra service delivery costs (Dastidar & Mukherjee, 2014), which will 
ultimately be borne by users or by taxpayers (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Tollison, 2012). In 
short, it adversely affects the expected social welfare of a contracting auction (Boehm & 
Olaya, 2006).  
Furthermore, Hart et al. (1997) contend that the policymakers engaging in rent-seeking in 
public services delivery are incentivized to create over-employment when public services 
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are delivered in-house, thus engaging in political patronage and obtaining political sup-
port. Conversely, if service delivery is contracted out, rent-seeking politicians will tend to 
obtain financial resources, rather than over-employment, which can be used for personal 
enrichment, to fund political activities (elections and party machinery), or both. Personal 
enrichment is closely associated with illegal behavior and corruption; however, the funding 
of political parties or electoral campaigns by firms is legal in most democracies. Hence, rent-
seeking does not necessarily involve illegal practices, and can be seen as different from cor-
ruption. In fact, our study does not deal with corruption, but rather with potential favorit-
ism between political parties and firms, based on funding to the party, and revolving doors 
between governments and firms. 
According to Ariño (2009), decisions related to the procurement of public services are also 
one of the main sources of political rent-seeking and favoritism in Spain. On the one hand, 
scholars and politicians recognize that the rules on the financing of Spanish political parties 
establish an overly restrictive framework for securing resources –donations are limited to 
€60,000 per donor, and the contributions by party members are largely insignificant–, and 
create a system that is overly dependent on government subsidies (Pujas & Rhodes, 1999; 
Casal et al., 2014). In fact, this has been used as an argument to explain why Spanish political 
parties have irregularly obtained resources at some point (Bel et al., 2014); since the 1990s, 
judiciary courts and the Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Cuentas) have investigated several 
political parties over events such as the cancellation of parties’ bank debts, corporate dona-
tions and bribery. 
On the other hand, the processes for awarding contracts in Spain are not characterized by 
transparency and independence. The lack of transparency was partially addressed some 
years ago by Law 30/2007 on Public Sector Contracts. However, external control is insuffi-
cient, and the hiring process is largely under the control of local government itself. Besides, 
an additional problem is the difficulty faced by the judiciary in obtaining evidence of mal-
practice, and the lengthy judicial processes. An index recently developed by the RAND 
Corporation (Stanley et al., 2014) assesses aspects such as the expectation of bribes and anti-
bribery laws, and ranks Spain as one of the developed countries with the highest risk of 
bribery. 
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Against this background, our paper focuses on two main research questions, namely, the 
possible existence of political connections between the main Spanish political parties and 
major private firms in the urban water delivery industry; and the impact of two laws (Or-
ganic Law 8/2007 and Law 30/2007) passed in Spain in 2007, which were aimed at increas-
ing transparency in the funding of political parties, and ensuring objectivity in the procure-
ment of public services. Our first hypothesis is the existence of a systematic relationship 
between companies that win privatization contests and the political party that holds the 
municipal government. This is a reasonable suspicion in Spain, judging by the many cases 
that are currently under judicial investigation for alleged corporate payments in exchange 
for preferential treatment in the awarding of public contracts for water service management 
(GWI, 2013). Due to the slowness of the judicial system in Spain, most of these cases date 
back to the past decade. If our study reveals significant relationships, these could be inter-
preted as indirect evidence of favoritism. Our second and more interesting hypothesis is 
that the legal reforms implemented in 2007 made it more difficult to engage in favoritism 
in the awarding to private firms of contracts for urban water delivery. 
The study centers on 922 agreements to privatize water services management made by local 
governments in Spain between January 1984 and April 2016. The methodology used is mul-
tinomial logistic regression. Our results show evidence of a statistically significant associa-
tion between the likelihood of specific firms securing (or not) the contracts, and the pres-
ence of a specific political party in government in the period before reforms. These signifi-
cant relationships disappeared in the period after 2007, which may be an indication of how 
institutional reforms can weaken political connections. In this way, we contribute to the 
literature in this field of research by providing evidence to suggest bias in the awarding of 
contracts, depending on the governing political party in the municipality, and pointing to 
the effectiveness of institutional reforms in ending these practices. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes several cases of 
political connections in contracting out local public services in Spain. Section 3 outlines the 
legal framework for the privatization of the urban water service in Spain, and the reforms 
passed in 2007 regarding procurement of public services and funding of political parties. 
Section 4 describes the data and the methodology. The results are presented in Section 5, 
and the final Section summarizes and sets some policy conclusions. 
 
 
4
2. Political connections related to contracting of local public services in Spain. 
When Spaniards these days are surveyed about Spain’s problems, corruption is revealed to 
be a major concern (Schwab, 2016; EC, 2014). Suspicions of corruption and judicial investi-
gations affect many areas of public policy and virtually all political parties that have held 
significant government positions in the last decades. Within this context, there are many 
cases of procurement under investigation by the Spanish judiciary for alleged bribery. A 
number of contracts are under judicial investigation, such as those relating to the Gürtel 
Case, the Púnica Operation, the Pokemon Case (also known as the Bárcenas Case)1, among oth-
ers. In all these cases, the investigations focus on major business groups that operate in 
Spain. For instance, in the investigation of the Gürtel Case, a judicial writ issued by the Span-
ish Audiencia Nacional –one of Spain’s highest judicial bodies– (Juzgado de Instrucción Central 
5; Writ of November 26, 2014:94–95), presents indicia that a concessionaire owned by Fo-
mento de Construcciones y Contratas (FCC) and SUFI Group did pay commissions in exchange 
for local services contracts in the municipality of Majadahonda (Madrid), which was gov-
erned by the Popular Party (Partido Popular or PP). 
Furthermore, within the investigation of the Bárcenas Case, it has been proven that large 
business groups supplied substantial amounts of money to the Popular Party. Between 2002 
and 2009, FCC contributed €5.03 million to the Popular Party, making it the second largest 
donor after the public works company Sacyr, which contributed about €6 million.2 José Ma-
ría Mayor Oreja, former president of FCC’s construction division and brother of Jaime 
Mayor Oreja, minister in the Popular Party central government between 1996 and 2001, 
                                                 
1 This case has been named the Bárcenas Case after Luis Bárcenas, who was Manager (1982-1987, 
1993-2008) and later Treasurer (2008-2009) of the Popular Party, and also member of the Senate for 
this party (2004-2010). The Popular Party holds the central government in Spain, as well as most 
regional and local governments. 
2 See details in Huffington Post, 11 May 2014 (http://www.huffingtonpost.es/2014/11/05/ hacien 
da-caso-barcenas_n_6108430.html); and Europa Press, 11 May 2014 (http://www.europapress.es 
/nacional/noticia-barcenas-hacienda-cree-no-hay-correlacion-temporal-donaciones-pp-contrato s-
publicos-20141105165940.html). 
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admitted before Judge Ruz (Audiencia Nacional, investigation into the Bárcenas Case) that he 
had made financial contributions to the Popular Party.3 
Within the water distribution sector itself, numerous cases of alleged bribery have been 
subject to judicial investigation. Those cases have been frequent enough as to be the object 
of a report issued by Global Water Intelligence (GWI, 2013), which provides extensive in-
formation on judicial inquiries affecting the two major water distribution firms in Spain, 
namely, Aqualia4 and Agbar.5 Taken together, these two firms cover about 67 percent of the 
municipalities with private delivery of urban water (around 75 percent of the population 
served by private firms). Other minor firms have also been affected, such as Emarsa and 
Aguas de Valencia. 
Finally, mention needs to be made of the common practice of revolving-doors between pol-
itics and big business in Spain, as documented by Castell & Trillas (2013:109–110). This 
practice refers to situations where politicians holding high positions in government are sub-
sequently appointed as members of the Board of Directors of large firms that have regula-
tory or contractual relations with the government, after they have withdrawn from institu-
tional political activities (Heyes, 2003). Within the context of this study, several former pol-
iticians of the Popular Party have been appointed as members of the Board of Directors of 
                                                 
3 See El País, 28 May 2013 (http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/05/28/actualidad/13697514 
84 _277881.html). 
4 Aqualia belongs to Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas (FCC), a group that used to be controlled 
by the Spanish Koplowitz family, until Inmobiliaria Carso (owned by the Mexican magnate Carlos 
Slim) bought a 25.6 percent ownership stake in FCC in late 2014 (FCC, 2015), thus becoming the 
major shareowner. In addition to providing water services to more than 850 Spanish municipalities, 
this holding company is also present in more than 50 countries, including China, Mexico, Portugal, 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Algeria. 
5 Agbar (an abbreviation of Aguas de Barcelona) is a subsidiary of the French holding company, Suez 
Environment. It comprises over 150 companies and has around 13,000 employees, and provides wa-
ter services not only in Spain but also in countries such as the United Kingdom, Mexico, China, 
Chile, Cuba, Colombia and Algeria. Moreover, this company operates under different names in dif-
ferent Spanish regions: Aigües de Barcelona in the metropolitan area of Barcelona and Sorea in the rest 
of Catalonia; Aquanex in Extremadura; Aquara in Aragon; Aquarbe in Cantabria, Basque Country and 
La Rioja; Aquaona in Castile-La Mancha and Castile and Leon; Asturagua in Asturias; Canaragua in 
the Canary Islands; Hidralia in Andalusia; Hidraqua in the Valencian Community; Hidrobal in the 
Balearic Islands; Hidrogea in Murcia; and, finally, Viaqua in Galicia. 
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FCC. In this vein, it is worth recalling that two prominent former members of the Popular 
Party were members of the FCC’s Board at the end of 2014 (FCC, 2015:3). One was Mar-
celino Oreja Aguirre, minister in the Spanish government (1976-1980) and first Popular 
Party candidate elected to the European Parliament in the 1989 election. He was later ap-
pointed Commissioner of Transportation and Energy for the European Commission (1994-
1999), a job which he was put forward for by the Popular Party. 
The second was Gustavo Villapalos Salas, who had formerly been minister of Education, 
Culture, and Sports (1995-2001) in the regional government of Madrid, under the ruling of 
the Popular Party. It is also interesting to note that in 2001, Abel Matutes was appointed to 
the FCC Board of Directors just after being minister of foreign affairs in the Popular Party’s 
first government (1996-2000). He was a member of that Board for most of the last decade. 
To our knowledge, there are no such political connections with former members of govern-
ments on the Boards of Directors of other firms in the urban water delivery sector; neither 
in Agbar6 –the other dominant firm–, nor in other firms with lesser market share. 
3. Privatization of urban water management in Spain 
3.1. Background and legal framework 
In Spain, municipal governments are responsible for the urban water supply, and they can 
choose among different forms of service delivery, which are set out in the current legisla-
tion.7 First, the municipal government may choose to manage the service in-house (the gov-
ernment itself manages the service) or to externalize it. Externalization can be effected by 
means of transferring delivery to a government-owned company (public firm), or privatiz-
ing it. In case of the latter option, privatization can be either partial, by means of a mixed 
firm (institutional public-private partnership, PPP), or full, whereby the service is con-
tracted out to a private firm (contractual public-private partnership). 
                                                 
6 Actually, five out of the seven members of Agbar’s Board of Directors are French. Its Executive 
President has never had any involvement in institutional activities. 
7 The regulation of the management of municipal services in Spain is set out in Law 7/1985 on Local 
Government Regulations, and Law 57/2003 on the Modernization of Local Government. 
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After the entry into force of Law 7/1985 on Local Government Regulations, many Spanish 
municipalities decided to privatize the management of water services. Three decades after 
that Law was passed, Spain has one of the highest levels of private sector participation in 
the management of urban water of any OECD country, as a percentage of the population 
served. According to González-Gómez et al. (2014), in 23 percent of Spanish municipalities, 
urban water supply is delivered via one of the forms of private management referred to in 
the legal system. However, this percentage rises to 55 percent when expressed in terms of 
population. This is indicative of the concentration of the privatization process in the more 
populated municipalities.8 The main motivations for water privatization in Spain have been 
pragmatic and, to a lesser extent, ideological and political (González-Gómez et al., 2011; 
Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2012). These results align closely with those obtained in Bel & Fageda's 
(2009) meta-regression analysis to explain local privatization decisions. 
According to the legislation in force, the bidding process for water services in Spain devel-
ops as follows. First, an announcement of the public tender of the contract is made, which 
includes the technical and economic conditions of the contract and the procedure and as-
sessment criteria. Details are also given on the commitments that must be fulfilled by the 
private firm awarded the contract. In light of all that information, private firms place a first-
price sealed-bid, in which bidders must submit their technical and financial proposal. Then, 
the municipal government awards the contract to the firm that made the best proposal with 
respect to a number of criteria. 
The jury in charge of adjudicating the bids is headed by the mayor or any other city council 
member or public servant. In the first place, the jury determines whether the proposals ful-
fill the commitments required in the public tender, and offers non-complying firms a dead-
line of three days to amend rectifiable mistakes in their proposals. Second, it evaluates and 
scores the technical conditions offered by bidders admitted to the contest, which are in-
cluded in the first-price sealed-bid and might refer to issues such as service quality, man-
agement or emergency plans in case of supply disruptions. Given the qualitative nature of 
                                                 
8 Partial privatization, by means of mixed firms, is also becoming increasingly common. Ownership 
is shared between the government, who usually retains ownership of a large fraction of the firm’s 
capital and is expected to ensure the public interest, and the private partner, who has industry 
know-how and is often in charge of the day-to-day management (Warner & Bel, 2008, González-
Gómez et al., 2009). 
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some of these technical conditions, their assessment unavoidably requires some value judg-
ments. As a third step, the financial conditions of each proposal –which include elements 
such as water tariffs and, occasionally, other proposals for infrastructure investment– are 
also scored. Finally, following a joint assessment of both technical and financial conditions, 
each bidder is awarded a final overall score, on which the decision is based. 
3.2. Legal reforms in 2007 regarding procurement of public services, and funding of political parties. 
In 2007, as mentioned in the Introduction, two laws were passed that changed the frame-
work of relations between political parties, local governments and private companies. This 
new scenario affected local procurement, and financing of political parties. One is Law 
30/2007 on Public Sector Contracts, and the other is Organic Law 8/2007 on the Financing 
of Political Parties. The former translates into the Spanish legal system Directive 
2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 31 March 2004, on 
the coordination of procedures for the awarding of contracts for public works, and supply 
of public services. The principles underlying the new rules are equality, transparency and 
confidentiality (Razquín, 2008). Three changes brought about by the new law are particu-
larly relevant. The first one is the obligation to publish online all the information related to 
the bidding processes promoted by local governments, which makes the process more pub-
lic and transparent. A second change affects the composition of the jury in charge of evalu-
ating the bids. While the mayor was always the president of the jury before the new law, 
the new regulations stipulate that the president can be a member of the city council, or a 
public servant. Still more important, a third change limits the discretionary power of the 
jury: whenever the decision gave more importance to qualitative factors than to quantita-
tive valuations automatically generated from the bidding clauses, Article 134.2 of the new 
law requires that the awarding reports must be reassessed by a committee formed by three 
external referees. Hence, the new regulation envisages the possibility of transferring to ex-
ternal referees the assessment of qualitative valuations (Moffa, 2009). 
Organic Law 8/2007 of 4 July, on the Financing of Political Parties, replaced the old legal 
framework established in 1987. A notable aspect of the new law was the ban on political 
parties receiving donations from companies working for the public administration. A sub-
sequent reform introduced in 2012 (Law 5/2012 of 22 October), extended the ban to com-
panies belonging to the same group as those who work for the administration, or who are 
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controlled by them. This seeks to prevent the party in power from granting contracts or 
services in exchange for financial contributions. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Variables, data and sources 
In order to test the hypotheses stated in the Introduction, we use information from 922 pri-
vatizations of the urban water service that occurred in Spain between January 1984 and 
April 2016. Given that our aim is to shed some light on why local governments choose one 
particular firm over other alternatives, the first variable of interest in our research is the 
name of the firm to which the contract was awarded. 
As already noted, private firms, either contractual or institutional PPPs, managed the urban 
water service in approximately 1,800 Spanish municipalities in 2016. It is worth noting that 
until 2008 there was no public register with information about contracting procedures of 
local services in Spain. As described in Section 3.2, from 30 April 2008, Law 30/2007 on 
Public Sector Contracts required local administrations to create an institutional webpage 
named Contractor Profile, which is aimed at ensuring transparency and affording public ac-
cess to the information relating to the contractual activity of public administrations. Ac-
cordingly, from this date onwards, when a local government privatizes the management of 
a given service it must grant public access through the abovementioned webpage to all 
information related to the privatization. We have thus made use of this resource to collect 
information about privatizations taking place after Law 30/2007 was passed,9 and particu-
larly the name of the firm awarded the contract for the urban water service provision. 
In addition, we submitted postal or electronic requests to local councils that had privatized 
the service before that time, asking them for the date of the town council plenary session in 
which the decision to privatize was taken. We then referred to municipalities’ Official Ga-
zettes to obtain the name of the provider of the urban water service. Furthermore, in a few 
cases, we obtained this information directly from the web pages of the town councils. Tak-
ing these sources together, we collected information about 922 privatizations of the urban 
                                                 
9 Even so, some municipalities –particularly small ones– still do not have the Contractor Profile insti-
tutional webpage, which has caused additional difficulties in our data collection process. 
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water service in Spanish municipalities, which represent nearly 50 percent of total privati-
zations in the period of reference.10 
For the purpose of our research, we have firstly established three possible options for the 
firm chosen to privatize the urban water service, namely, Aqualia, Agbar, and Others. The 
group Others includes all firms other than those included in the first two groups, e.g., firms 
that operate at national level such as Acciona, Agua & Gestión, Gestagua, Hidrogestión, Urbaser 
and Valoriza, in addition to some companies that, as mentioned, operate mainly at regional 
level, including Aguas de Valencia, Facsa, Prodaisa and Espina & Delfín. 
In our sample, Aqualia was chosen to privatize the urban water service 314 times (34.1 per-
cent), Agbar 308 times (33.4 percent), while firms included in the group Others were chosen 
300 times (the remaining 32.5 percent) (Table 1). Furthermore, we can distinguish between 
the periods before and after the 2007 legal changes, in order to provide an initial description 
of the effect of reforms. The percentage of contracts awarded to big companies (Aqualia and 
Agbar) was larger in the period prior to the reform (1984-2006) and decreased in the period 
after the reform (2007-2016). The group of other companies, which was the one with the 
lowest percentage of contracts (23.2 percent) between 1984 and 2006, becomes the group 
with the highest share of contracts (45.8 percent) in the period 2007-2016. Aqualia secured 
39 percent of contracts between 1984 and 2006, but just 27.1 percent in the following period. 
Similarly, Agbar was awarded 37.8 percent of contracts in the period prior to the reform, 
but just 27.1 percent in the period after the reform. Finally, Table 1 also shows that the two 
biggest Spanish political parties, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español or PSOE) and the Popular Party have both awarded more contracts to Aqua-
lia than the average that this firm obtained all over Spain, while the opposite is true in the 
case of Agbar, to which PSOE, and particularly PP, have awarded a lower percentage of 
contracts than the share of contracts that Agbar has obtained all over Spain. 
Please, insert Table 1 here 
                                                 
10 Despite the lack of a public register until recently, we estimate that in the period 1984-2006 around 
1,350 privatizations of local water services took place in Spain, while between 2007 and 2016 the 
number of privatizations was approximately 450. Accordingly, the estimated representativeness of 
our sample was 85 and 40 percent before and after the legislative reforms passed in 2007, respec-
tively. 
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These changes occurred during a period in which the water delivery service industry was 
highly concentrated, as described in Bel et al. (2013:379), where concentration ratios were 
compared between 2003 and 2009. The two biggest companies of the sector covered 69 per-
cent of population in Andalusia and 91 percent in Catalonia, two of the most populated 
regions in Spain with private contracting practices. In 2009, these shares increased to 79 
percent in the case of Andalusia and to 92 percent in Catalonia.11 Herfindahl-Hirschman in-
dices were also very similar in 2003 and 2009. Therefore, the increase in contracts awarded 
to other companies after the reforms cannot not apparently simply be explained by a change 
in the industry market structure unrelated to the policy evaluated. 
Furthermore, note that changes between the periods before and after the reform are partic-
ularly large in the case of contracts awarded to Aqualia by municipal governments ruled by 
the big political parties. There is a difference of 21 percentage points between the two peri-
ods for PP –from 47.4 percent to 26.4 percent– and 13.5 percentage points for PSOE –from 
43.9 percent to 30.4 percent. Smaller changes are found in the case of contracts awarded to 
Agbar, though percentages of contracts awarded by both PP and PSOE also diminished with 
respect to the period prior to the reform. All political parties awarded much larger percent-
ages of contracts to other companies in the period 2007-2016. 
In order to explain the choice of the firm selected to privatize the urban water service and 
test the hypotheses established in the Introduction, we have selected several variables re-
lating to the policy framework, some features of the municipality, and also to the party in 
power of the local government at the time the decision was made. Table 2 presents some 
basic statistics for these variables, while the Appendix summarizes their description and 
sources. Our first variable is Reform 2007, which is a policy variable intended to account for 
the influence of the legal reform implemented in 2007 regarding both public procurement 
of public contracts (Law 30/2007) and the financing of political parties (Organic Law 
8/2007) on privatization choices. From a technical point of view, it should be noted, how-
ever, that this variable is only capable of controlling for a structural change between the 
                                                 
11 Note that privatization policies in the water delivery service were almost non-existent in the case 
of Madrid, another highly-populated Spanish region. 
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two periods, before and after the 2007 reforms, meaning that our approach does not provide 
an estimate of causality. 
Please, insert Table 2 here 
A second set of control variables includes two market variables related to the municipality 
that privatizes the urban water service: population, measured as the number of inhabitants 
and taken from the Spanish Statistical Office (INE); and economic activity, measured by the 
indicator of economic activity in Spanish municipalities provided by La Caixa (2014). The 
third set of variables includes 16 geographical dummy variables that take the value 1 if the 
municipality belongs to the regions of Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Basque 
Country, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and León, Catalonia, Extremadura, 
Galicia, Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja and the Valencian Community, respectively, and 0 other-
wise.12 These variables are used in order to capture the possible existence of regional unob-
servable patterns in the decision to privatize the urban water service or other unobservable 
features of the region that could affect the selection of the service provider. 
Regarding the regional patterns observed in Table 2, Aqualia seems to do well in Andalusia 
while Agbar is overrepresented in Catalonia. There is a sharp difference between the market 
structures of water services in both regions; while nearly 13 per cent of Andalusian munic-
ipalities had the urban water service contracted out to a private firm in 2009, in Catalonia 
this figure raised up to 74 per cent (Bel et al., 2013). Furthermore, the distribution of local 
power is also fairly different. According to data from 2011, Popular Party and PSOE had 34 
and 48 per cent of the mayors in Andalusia, respectively; conversely, in Catalonia Popular 
Party had less than 1 per cent of mayors, and PSOE around 20 per cent. Finally, while ide-
ology has been found to be a strongly influential factor in contracting out water service in 
Andalusia (Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2012), with conservative local governments privatizing 
more frequently, available evidence for Catalonia indicates that ideology did not play a key 
role in contracting out water services (Miralles, 2009). 
                                                 
12 In this regard, note that these dummies represent all Spanish regions but Navarra and the auton-
omous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, for which the sample has no observations. 
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Taking all abovementioned facts into account, our belief is that the strength of Aqualia in 
Andalusia is not related with PP being particularly strong, but rather to the fact that mu-
nicipalities governed by this right-wing party tend to contract out water more frequently. 
Instead, the strength of Agbar in Catalonia would be explained by historical reasons; Agbar 
is the oldest player in the Spanish water sector, was created in 1867 to deliver water service 
in the city of Barcelona, capital of Catalonia, and has her headquarters in this city. Although 
empirical studies on the urban water service in other Spanish regions are scarcer, it is worth 
noting the case of the Valencian Community, where the overrepresentation of the group 
Others can be explained by the seniority in the area of a regional company, Aguas de Valencia, 
which has not expanded outside the region. 
Finally, the political variables intended to capture the effect of the party in power in the 
local government are the following: PSOE, which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the 
left-wing Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party was in power when the decision to privatize was 
taken and 0 otherwise; and PP, which takes the value 1 if the right-wing Popular Party was 
ruling the local government at the time of privatization and 0 otherwise. In both cases the 
data come from the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration. In addition, 
we have included two further variables, namely PSOE*Reform 2007 and PP*Reform 2007, 
computed as the interaction between the variables PSOE and PP, on the one hand, and the 
policy variable Reform 2007, on the other. These two variables are intended to test whether 
the reforms weakened (or not) political connections. Furthermore, majority is a dummy var-
iable that takes the value 1 if the party in power held a majority when the decision to pri-
vatize was taken, and 0 otherwise; the number of city councilors defines this variable, with 
data sourced from the Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs. And finally, continuity is a dummy 
that takes of the value 1 if the decision to privatize was taken in the second or a subsequent 
term of office of the party ruling the town council. 
4.2. A brief methodological note 
In order to formalize the choice of the firm selected to privatize the urban water service, 
represented by the variable Y, and its determinants we use multinomial logit regression 
techniques (see Greene, 2012:763–766 for details). In particular, so as to identify the model, 
we compare the probability that municipality i selects firm m to privatize the urban water 
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service, where m = Aqualia and Agbar, against the base category which is set to Others. In 
formal terms, our model is: 
 
where policy variable is a dummy for the 2007 reform, while market variables, regional variables 
and political variables are different vectors of variables included in our models aimed at cap-
turing features of the municipality and the party in power of the local government, as ex-
plained in Section 4.1. 
This expression has been fitted by maximum likelihood using Stata software, with robust 
standard errors to account for the presence of heterogeneity in the sample. In addition, and 
provided that the coefficients from the multinomial logit do not have a direct interpretation, 
i.e., they are relative to the base outcome, we have computed the marginal effects that meas-
ure the effect of changing the value of each explanatory variable on the probability of ob-
serving a given outcome: Aqualia, Agbar or Others. 
5. Results 
The results for the estimated marginal effects of the explanatory variables included in our 
analysis are in Table 3. The model is jointly significant and the goodness-of-fit is high com-
pared to other studies conducting logistic regressions. Coefficients for variables are pre-
sented grouped according to the classification mentioned above: policy variable (Reform 
2007), market variables (population and economic activity), regional variables (dummy regional 
variables) and political variables (dummies for political party, either PSOE or PP, interactions 
between political parties and the policy variable, majority and continuity). 
Please, insert Table 3 here 
Our main variable used to assess the possible existence of a structural change produced by 
the 2007 reforms is the policy variable Reform 2007. Its associated coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level for Agbar, but positive and statisti-
cally significant, also at 5 percent, for the group Others. This result indicates that the reform 
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was correlated with an increase in contracts awarded to the smaller companies at the ex-
pense of one of the larger groups, Agbar. The magnitude of the marginal effect is slightly 
lower in the former case than in the latter. This result constitutes our first evidence of how 
the reforms seem to have affected contracting choices. 
Market variables population and economic activity are not significant at standard confidence 
levels in this first model.13 The estimated parameters for the set of regional variables reflects 
some regional unobservable patterns characterized by the greater relative presence of some 
companies in certain areas of Spain. This may be due to a business strategy phenomenon: 
companies that are the first to enter a particular area may have an advantage when it comes 
to business expansion in that area, whether due to their better understanding of the area, 
and/or due to an emulation effect, whereby municipalities tend to follow the choices of 
their neighbors. 
The political variables majority and continuity are significant, in both cases at 5 percent, only 
for the contracts awarded to the group Others. Governments of political parties that enjoy 
a majority have a higher probability of choosing firms other than Agbar and Aqualia. Fur-
thermore, governments that have been re-elected are less inclined to contract firms other 
than the two major ones. Perhaps the extended period spent in local government facilitates 
the creation of networks that ultimately promote the awarding of contracts to the major 
firms.14 
                                                 
13 As a result of the comments of one referee, we have also included in the multinomial logit regres-
sion the square of population as an additional explanatory variable, in order to test for the possible 
existence of non-linearities in the effect of population on the probability of choosing a given firm for 
the privatization of the urban water service. However, the estimated parameter for this variable is 
not significant at standard confidence levels in any cases, while the estimated parameters for the 
rest of variables in our models and their statistical significance remain unchanged. Moreover, given 
the highly skewed distributions of the market variables we also tried logs rather than levels for pop-
ulation and economic activity. Results for the marginal effects of interest in our models do not change, 
except for the variable PP in column two, i.e., the marginal effect for Agbar, that now becomes sig-
nificant at 10 per cent rather than at 5 per cent as in the model with levels. 
14 In addition to our set of political variables, also following the suggestion from one referee, we 
have included in the multinomial regression four variables computed as the interactions between 
majority and continuity, on the one hand, and PP and PSOE, on the other. However, none of these 
variables was found to be statistically significant; moreover, including interactions even reduced the 
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Beyond the reform of 2007, one of our aims is to analyze the role of political parties and 
their links to the big companies at the time when privatization took place, which allows us 
to test our hypothesis regarding how legal reforms weakened political connections. Table 3 
above shows some evidence related to the relationship between political parties and firms. 
In the case of Agbar, on the one hand, the marginal effects of variables PSOE and PP are 
negative and statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
This result suggests that when one of these parties governs the municipality, the probability 
of Agbar being awarded the contract is lower; furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is 
slightly larger in the case of the Popular Party. Thus, Agbar seems to perform poorly com-
pared to other companies in municipalities ruled by large political parties, especially in 
those ruled by the Popular Party. This is consistent with the actual evidence on political 
connections, given that Agbar is the main competitor of Aqualia and has not been officially 
involved with the Popular Party in rent-seeking activities or revolving doors, unlike the 
latter. On the other hand, we also find a positive and statistically significant (at 5 percent) 
relationship between the variable PP and Aqualia, indicating that when the Popular Party 
rules the municipality, the probability of Aqualia being awarded the contract increases by 
13.1 percent. In addition, the estimated marginal effect for the variable PP*Reform 2007 is 
negative and also statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level, indicating that 
the passing of Law 30/2007 and Organic Law 8/2007 weakened this relationship.15 
                                                 
statistical significance of the variables majority and continuity in some of our estimations. These re-
sults might be indicating that what really matter is whether or not the political party ruling the 
municipality holds a majority of councillors and not the party they belong to, either PP or PSOE. In 
fact, political coalitions have historically been unusual in Spanish municipalities, where the most 
voted party normally rules the local government. According to these arguments, we have preferred 
to follow a parsimony principle by keeping our model specification as simple as possible. 
15 In order to further investigate the relationship between the Popular Party and Aqualia and the 
effect of the 2007 reforms on that relationship we have also estimated a logistic regression for the 
probability of Aqualia being awarded the contract for the management of water services after a pri-
vatization tender. The estimated marginal effects, which are available on request, are fairly similar 
to those from the multinomial logistic regression, and unequivocally show how the probability of 
Aqualia being awarded the contract increases –in this case by 14.3 percent– when the Popular Party 
is ruling the local government. Besides, the marginal effect of the variable PP*Reform 2007 is also 
negative and statistically significant at a confidence level of 5 percent, corroborating the notion that 
the political connection between the Popular Party and Aqualia weakened after the reforms. 
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Furthermore, we have separately estimated two additional multinomial regressions for the 
periods 1984-2006, before the implementation of the 2007 reform, and 2007-2016, after the 
passing of Law 30/2007 and Organic Law 8/2007. The results obtained show, once again, 
that the Popular Party is positively associated with Aqualia (at 5 percent significance level) 
in the period prior to the reform and negatively associated with Agbar (in this case, at a 
confidence level of 1 percent), its main competitor (Table 4). However, this relationship dis-
appears if the sample considers only the contracts awarded in the period after the reform, 
i.e., between 2007 and 2016 (Table 5). Accordingly, the probability of Agbar being awarded 
the contract for the management of urban water services between 1984 and 2006 was 19.8 
percent lower when the Popular Party governed the municipality. In contrast, the proba-
bility of Aqualia being awarded the contract was 15.2 percent higher with a local govern-
ment ruled by the Popular Party. After the reforms of 2007, as mentioned, no specific rela-
tionship is identified in terms of statistical significance between political parties ruling the 
local government and firms awarded contracts. 
Moreover, a change in the patterns of the regional marginal effects is also observed between 
periods 1984-2006 and 2007-2016, mostly consisting of an increase after the 2007 reform of 
the probability of contracts awarded to firms in the group Others in all regions, in detriment 
of the two larger firms Aqualia and Agbar. Although these changes have no easy interpreta-
tion, in our opinion, they might be related to the fact that reforms carried out 2007, which 
affected all Spanish regions equally by introducing transparence and reducing discretion-
ary power in contracting out public services, fostered a convergence in the regional patterns 
of contracting out. Also, they could be interpreted in the context of a recent ideological 
movement worldwide, with high impact on media, against privatization and the control of 
the urban water service by large multinationals. In this context, once privatization has been 
decided, local governments could prefer contracting out with regional companies in order 
to reduce the opposition of citizens. 
Please, insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
Finally, we have implemented a couple of additional tests aimed at further checking the 
robustness of the abovementioned results. On the one hand, we carried out several falsifi-
cation tests substituting the real reform implemented in 2007 with some placebo reforms, 
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as if the regulatory changes had occurred at other previous points in time. Unlike the vari-
ables representing the interaction between political parties and the real reform, we expect 
interaction with these placebo variables not to be statistically significant. Results from this 
robustness test, which replicates the methods and specifications considered so far, are pre-
sented in Table 6; for the sake of simplicity, it only displays the estimated coefficients for 
our variables of interest in the case of the multinomial regression. Results are satisfactory, 
in that they show that only the real reform produces a statistically significant decrease in 
the contracting relationship between the Popular Party and Aqualia, underlining the re-
forms’ impact on political connections.16 
Please, insert Table 6 here 
On the other hand, we also run a regression with year fixed effects considering the whole 
period of analysis (1984-2016) replacing the policy dummy variable. The year not included 
in the model that acts as benchmark by which to interpret the rest of the year specific dum-
mies is 2007, the year of the reforms. Our results for this analysis are presented in Table 7, 
which only provides information regarding coefficients of these year-specific fixed effects 
and coefficients associated with political variables. Note, however, that the rest of the re-
gressors –as well as all the other year dummies– were also included in the regression. Re-
sults show a sharp change in the marginal effects for Aqualia after 2007. The coefficients of 
years 2008 and 2009 are large, negative and statistically significant, indicating that Aqualia 
suffered a reduction in the probability of being awarded a water distribution contract in the 
first two years after the reform. In contrast, Agbar saw an increase in this probability in the 
same period. Moreover, the coefficient of the binary variable indicating whether the Popu-
lar Party rules the government remains positive and statistically significant for Aqualia, and 
negative and statistically significant for Agbar. 
Please, insert Table 7 here 
                                                 
16 Results from the falsification tests in the logistic regression for Aqualia also show how the only 
reform that debilitates the relationship between the Popular Party and Aqualia in awarding contracts 
is the real one. These results are also available on request. 
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Results from all these robustness tests provide further evidence to support the conclusions 
of our research. The reform made the market for contracting out more transparent and com-
petitive, and both big companies (Aqualia and Agbar) lost market share with respect to the 
others. However, apparently only Aqualia experienced a systematic loss of the contracts that 
it had been receiving from the Popular Party before 2007; in the case of Agbar, the decrease 
in the number of contracts was not linked to any connection to a particular political party. 
Are the relationships found in our empirical analysis between political parties and water 
distribution firms mere coincidence? Or, on the contrary, are they the result of favoritism 
or discrimination stemming from firms’ different behavior with respect to funding political 
parties and/or revolving-doors practices? While there is no publicly-available evidence 
that irrefutably points to a causal link, it is public knowledge that FCC, the holding com-
pany of the water distribution firm showing a significant association with water service 
concessions made by PP-governed municipalities, has been the second biggest donor to 
that party in the past decade.17 Moreover, several major Popular Party politicians have 
come to occupy seats on the FCC Board of Directors after leaving their institutional respon-
sibilities, as described in Section 2. Conversely, the company Agbar, which showed a signif-
icant negative association with the concessions for water services granted by PP-governed 
municipalities, is not among the list of donors to the Popular Party, nor were prominent 
members of the PP appointed to its Board of Directors. 
Of course, showing favoritism to particular firms in local concessions can be the result of 
atomized decisions by local governments seeking rents or other compensation. In fact, cases 
under judicial review in Spanish provinces such as A Coruña, Asturias or Huelva involve 
municipalities governed by different political parties, within each province. But beyond 
these isolated, atomized decisions, our results provide evidence that may well suggest that 
                                                 
17 We thank a referee for pointing out that a donation of €5.03 million over seven years is a small 
amount of money relative to the potential size of the contracts involved. Along these lines, Tullock 
(1972:355) argued that, given that there is little money in politics considering the value of public 
policies at stake ‘…the amount of influence that can be purchased by this method is small’. This view has 
received empirical support in studies such as Ansolabehere et al. (2003) (see Stratmann, 2005 for a 
deeper discussion). We should also recall, however, that the amounts of money in Spanish politics 
are relatively small compared, for instance, to US politics; by way of example, the Popular Party 
spent a total of €22.7 million in the 2008 national election campaign. 
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higher-level decisions based on the company's political connections and political party 
funding at the national level might have played a significant role in the awarding of water 
concessions in Spain over the last three decades. Furthermore, our results also suggest that 
legal reforms enacted in 2007, aimed at improving public procurement and the financing of 
political parties, weakened favoritism. Further research on these issues is definitely needed. 
6. Summary, conclusions and policy implications 
Contracting out of public services is an area of public policy in which political rent-seeking 
and favoritism are believed to be relatively common. If that is in fact the case, eradicating 
such practices through legal reforms to weaken political connections would undoubtedly 
be in the public interest. However, a problem associated with the adoption of remedial 
measures is the lack of precise knowledge of the extent of these practices; since these are 
illegal or irregular practices, they are systematically hidden. 
In this research, we evaluate legal reforms aimed at weakening the existence of potential 
relationships between political parties in governments that award contracts, and private 
firms that secure these contracts. The context of our study is the widespread concern over 
corruption and favoritism in Spain, where many cases of public services procurement are 
subject to judicial investigations, and the 2007 reforms of public sector contracting and the 
financing of political parties. We sought to understand whether the apparent biases in favor 
of a specific firm –taken as a proxy for favoritism (or the opposite, in cases of negative bias)– 
are only isolated events or, conversely, whether they might be part of a more complex net-
work of decision-making aimed either at financing political parties, and/or rewarding 
firms’ political connections. In order to shed more light on this possibility, we look for sta-
tistically significant relationships between political parties in local government and firms 
awarded contracts for provision of public services, which could suggest systematic favora-
ble (or contrarian) treatment. Moreover, we analyze how legal reforms might affect and 
potentially weaken these systematic relationships. 
The results we have obtained, which are robust to different model specifications and statis-
tical treatments, could be taken as evidence of political favoritism shown by a political party 
to one of the leading business groups with interests in the water industry. City councils 
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governed by the Popular Party were more likely to award the service contract to the com-
pany Aqualia, and were also less likely to award it to Agbar –Aqualia's main competitor. Our 
results are consistent with the facts that, as proven in judicial investigations, the owner of 
Aqualia –Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas (FCC)– was the second largest donor of funds 
to the Popular Party between 2002 and 2009. On the contrary, neither Agbar nor its owner 
company –Suez Environment– have appeared in the lists of donors to the Popular Party. 
Furthermore, it is publicly known that several politicians that enjoyed high positions of 
office, including national ministries and regional ministries, in Popular Party governments, 
have regularly occupied positions on the Board of Directors of Fomento de Construcciones y 
Contratas (after leaving institutional office), whereas no former national minister or regional 
minister –whether from the Popular Party or the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party– has been 
a member of the Board of Directors of Agbar or Suez Environment in the period we study. 
More interestingly, our results also suggest that this systematic relationship weakened after 
the legal reforms carried out in 2007, which aimed to ensure a more transparent and open 
contracting process.  
The abovementioned results can be interpreted, in our opinion, as evidence supporting the 
need for changes to the regulatory and institutional framework to weaken political connec-
tions. In the case of Spain, these reforms were in the public interest, intended to erode con-
nections between political parties and firms. Our results were indeed consistent with per-
ceptions of corruption shown by indicators developed by Transparency International 
(Transparency International, 2014) and the RAND Corporation (Stanley et al., 2014). Im-
proving the regulation of political parties’ funding, as well as delivering faster and tougher 
sanctions in proven cases of corruption, could further reduce the temptation to engage in 
illegal practices. Additionally, ensuring greater transparency in public procurement pro-
cesses, and building more effective mechanisms to monitor the contracting process, as in 
the case studied, would make it more difficult to engage in favoritism (or discrimination) 
when awarding public contracts. Of course, governments and legislators are responsible 
for introducing measures that aim to achieve such improvements. 
Furthermore, it is also our belief that these policy implications are of particular relevance 
for those policymakers that tend to positively value cooperation between the public and 
private sector in the delivery of public services. In fact, suspicion of political favoritism and 
corruption has been one of the key drivers of remunicipalization of local services in the 
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past; and is also a factor in the current wave of remunicipalization spreading across several 
countries, particularly in Europe. Making favoritism in public procurement more difficult 
to engage in, and thus less common, might well be a good way to reduce pressure in favor 
of remunicipalization, thus helping to preserve cooperation between public and private ac-
tors as a tool for public sector reform. 
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Table 1 – Contracts awarded by firm, period* and political party ruling the local government: Frequencies in the sample. 
(Number of cases and percentages). 
 PSOE  PP  Other political parties  ALL political parties 
Firm TOTAL period 
Before 
reform 
After 
reform 
 TOTAL 
period 
Before 
reform 
After 
reform 
 TOTAL 
period 
Before 
reform 
After 
reform 
 TOTAL 
period 
Before 
reform 
After 
reform 
Aqualia 156 
(39.6%) 
118 
(43.9%) 
38 
(30.4%) 
 110 
(35.4%) 
63 
(47.4%) 
47 
(26.4%) 
 48 
(22.1%) 
29 
(21.2%) 
19 
(23.8%) 
 314 
(34.1%) 
210 
(39.0%) 
104 
(27.1%) 
Agbar 123 
(31.2%) 
88 
(32.7%) 
35 
(28.0%) 
 75 
(24.1%) 
36 
(27.1%) 
39 
(21.9%) 
 110 
(50.7%) 
80 
(58.4%) 
30 
(37.5%) 
 308 
(33.4%) 
204 
(37.8%) 
104 
(27.1%) 
Others 115 
(29.2%) 
63 
(23.4%) 
52 
(41.6%) 
 126 
(40.5%) 
34 
(25.5%) 
92 
(51.7%) 
 59 
(27.2%) 
28 
(20.4%) 
31 
(38.7%) 
 300 
(32.5%) 
125 
(23.2%) 
175 
(45.8%) 
ALL firms 394 
(100%) 
269 
(100%) 
125 
(100%) 
 311 
(100%) 
133 
(100%) 
178 
(100%) 
 217 
(100%) 
137 
(100%) 
80 
(100%) 
 922  
(100%) 
539  
(100%) 
383  
(100%) 
Source: Authors. 
* Total period: 1984-2016; before reform: 1984-2006; after reform: 2007-2016. 
  
 
 
Table 2 – Sample description: Explanatory variables by firm group. 
 All Aqualia Agbar Others 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Market variables         
Population (inhabitants) 17,298.3 35,126.2 18,993.5 34,612.3 19,980.4 42,531.0 13,137 26,103 
Economic activity (no dimension) 29.47 76.62   30.96 71.49 36.19 96.60 22.43 56.32 
Regional variables (dummies)         
Andalusia 0.233 - 0.382 - 0.178 - 0.133 - 
Aragon 0.024 - 0.013 - 0.029 - 0.030 - 
Asturias 0.020 - 0.029 - 0.032 - 0.000 - 
Balearic Islands 0.011 - 0.013 - 0.003 - 0.020 - 
Basque Country 0.006 - 0.006 - 0.013 - 0.000 - 
Canary Islands 0.018 - 0.022 - 0.029 - 0.003 - 
Cantabria 0.030 - 0.016 - 0.019 - 0.057 - 
Castile-La Mancha 0.155 - 0.197 - 0.101 - 0.167 - 
Castile and Leon 0.057 - 0.063 - 0.097 - 0.016 - 
Catalonia 0.158 - 0.067 - 0.289 - 0.120 - 
Extremadura 0.059 - 0.073 - 0.049 - 0.053 - 
Galicia 0.057 - 0.025 - 0.065 - 0.083 - 
Madrid 0.002 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.007 - 
Murcia 0.034 - 0.041 - 0.029 - 0.030 - 
La Rioja 0.006 - 0.013 - 0.003 - 0.003 - 
Valencian Community  0.124 - 0.038 - 0.062 - 0.277 - 
Political variables (dummies)         
PSOE  0.427 - 0.497 - 0.399 - 0.383 - 
PP 0.337 - 0.350 - 0.243 - 0.420 - 
Majority 0.667 - 0.659 - 0.640 - 0.703 - 
Continuity 0.683 - 0.710 - 0.691 - 0.647 - 
Table 3 – Multinomial logistic regression: Estimated marginal effects, 1984-2016. 
 Aqualia Agbar Others 
Policy variable    
Reform 2007 0.0124 (0.0655) -0.1400 (0.0602)** 0.1276 (0.0562)** 
Market variables    
Population 1.58e-07 (1.5e-06) 2.4e-06 (1.6e-06) -2.5e-06 (2.5e-06) 
Economic activity 0.0001 (0.0007) -0.0007 (0.0007) 0.0007 (0.0011) 
Regional variables    
Andalusia 0.0001 (0.1210) -0.2299 (0.1276)* 0.2299 (0.1884) 
Aragon -0.2903 (0.1592)* -0.0342 (0.1528) 0.3246 (0.2007) 
Asturias 1.0361 (0.1597)*** 1.1406 (0.1640)*** -2.1767 (0.2236)*** 
Balearic Islands -0.0837 (0.1229) -0.4563 (0.2361)* 0.5400 (0.2182)** 
Basque Country 0.9646 (0.2019)*** 1.1772 (0.1983)*** -2.1418 (0.2410)*** 
Cantabria -0.3053 (0.1529)** -0.2320 (0.1578) 0.5274 (0.1985)*** 
Castile-La Mancha -0.0651 (0.1239) -0.2307 (0.1312)* 0.2958 (0.1871) 
Castile and Leon -0.0889 (0.1350) 0.0862 (0.1415) 0.0027 (0.2063) 
Catalonia -0.3366 (0.1279)*** 0.0272 (0.1303) 0.3194 (0.1943) 
Extremadura -0.1026 (0.1306) -0.1949 (0.1384) 0.2976 (0.1931) 
Galicia -0.3867 (0.1410)*** -0.0821 (0.1390) 0.4688 (0.1929)** 
Madrid -1.5747 (0.1756)*** -1.6180 (0.1812)*** 3.1927 (0.2695)*** 
Murcia -0.1294 (0.1392) -0.2144 (0.1458) 0.3438 (0.2002)* 
La Rioja 0.0875 (0.2124) -0.2434 (0.2468) 0.1559 (0.2840) 
Valencian Community -0.3745 (0.1310)*** -0.2185 (0.1344) 0.5930 (0.1877)*** 
Political variables    
PSOE 0.0620 (0.0553) -0.0913 (0.0508)* 0.0293 (0.0506) 
PP 0.1317 (0.0635)** -0.1524 (0.0606)** 0.0207 (0.0571) 
PSOE*Reform 2007 -0.0899 (0.0806) 0.1040 (0.0778) -0.0142 (0.0723) 
PP* Reform 2007 -0.1417 (0.0825)* 0.1053 (0.0804) 0.0365 (0.0732) 
Majority -0.0461 (0.0332) -0.0205 (0.0325) 0.0665 (0.0327)** 
Continuity 0.0507 (0.0346) 0.0229 (0.0334) -0.0736 (0.0296)** 
Observations 922 
Log likelihood -851.50 
LR Chi-squared 4,517.56*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.159 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in brackets; *, ** and *** mean statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
  
 
 
Table 4 – Multinomial logistic regression: Estimated marginal effects 1984-2006. 
 Aqualia Agbar Others 
Market variables    
Population 1.1e-06 (2.0e-06) 4.2e-06 (2.1e-06)*** -5.4e-06 (1.9e-06)*** 
Economic activity -0.0004 (0.0009) -0.0015 (0.0010) 0.0020 (0.0007)*** 
Regional variables    
Andalusia 0.0490 (0.1481) -0.0959 (0.1447) 0.0469 (0.1680) 
Aragon -0.2253 (0.2782) 0.1733 (0.2350) 0.0519 (0.2472) 
Asturias 1.0010 (0.2125)*** 1.2398 (0.2094)*** -2.2409 (0.2341)*** 
Balearic Islands 0.0253 (0.2285) -0.2890 (0.2692) 0.2637 (0.2088) 
Basque Country 0.9572 (0.3007)*** 1.2639 (0.2544)*** -2.2212 (0.2514)*** 
Cantabria -0.0931 (0.2167) -0.1928 (0.2259) -0.2859 (0.1942) 
Castile-La Mancha 0.0877 (0.1578) -0.0882 (0.1559) 0.0005 (0.1738) 
Castile and Leon 0.1174 (0.1868) 0.1023 (0.1893) -0.2198 (0.2440) 
Catalonia -0.2019 (0.1539) 0.1192 (0.1481) 0.0827 (0.1735) 
Extremadura -0.0066 (0.1617) -0.0830 (0.1603) 0.0896 (0.1733) 
Galicia -0.3070 (0.1753)* 0.0877 (0.1639) 0.2192 (0.1768) 
Madrid -1.5400 (0.2363)*** -1.5326 (0.2271)*** 3.0726 (0.3149)*** 
Murcia -0.0285 (0.1682) -0.0702 (0.1658) 0.0987 (0.1878) 
La Rioja 1.9102 (0.2458)*** -3.0720 (0.2299)*** 1.1618 (0.2341)*** 
Valencian Community -0.1922 (0.1654) -0.1208 (0.1615) 0.3130 (0.1719)* 
Political variables    
PSOE 0.0997 (0.0609) -0.1305 (0.0562)** 0.0307 (0.0468) 
PP 0.1527 (0.0719)** -0.1986 (0.0680)*** 0.0459 (0.0549) 
Majority -0.0120 (0.0434) -0.0036 (0.0429) 0.0157 (0.0378) 
Continuity 0.0177 (0.0481) 0.0001 (0.0466) -0.0178 (0.0388) 
Observations 539 
Log likelihood -511.96 
Pseudo R-squared 0.115 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in brackets; *, ** and *** mean statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
  
 
 
Table 5 – Multinomial logistic regression: Estimated marginal effects 2007-2016. 
 Aqualia Agbar Others 
Market variables    
Population -2.1e-06 (1.5e-06) -1.6e-06 (2.2e-06) 3.8e-06 (2.0e-06)* 
Economic activity 0.0017 (0.0009)* 0.0020 (0.0012)* -0.0037 (0.0013)*** 
Regional variables    
Andalusia -1.0112 (0.1466)*** -1.5868 (0.1912)*** 2.5981 (0.1734)*** 
Aragon -1.3615 (0.1704)*** -1.3742 (0.1950)*** 2.7358 (0.1710)*** 
Asturias 0.0323 (0.1235) -0.0363 (0.1307) 0.0039 (0.1066) 
Balearic Islands -0.3969 (0.2352)* -3.7898 (0.3130)*** 4.1867 (0.2830)*** 
Basque Country -0.0226 (0.1482) 0.0100 (0.2361) 0.0125 (0.1898) 
Cantabria -1.4581 (0.1787)*** -1.4451 (0.1927)*** 2.9032 (0.1671)*** 
Castile-La Mancha -1.2208 (0.1461)*** -1.5185 (0.1815)*** 2.7393 (0.1628)*** 
Castile and Leon -1.2593 (0.1611)*** -1.1795 (0.1935)*** 2.4389 (0.2015)*** 
Catalonia -1.5087 (0.1744)*** -1.1819 (0.1947)*** 2.6907 (0.1801)*** 
Extremadura -1.1971 (0.1720)*** -1.4554 (0.2092)*** 2.6526 (0.1938)*** 
Galicia -1.4082 (0.1747)*** -1.4903 (0.1950)*** 2.8986 (0.1700)*** 
Madrid -2.6497 (0.2934)*** -2.9092 (0.3437)*** 5.5589 (0.3236)*** 
Murcia -0.3872 (0.2400) -3.7867 (0.3206)*** 4.1739 (0.2883)*** 
La Rioja 0.1048 (0.1649) -0.0673 (0.1830) -0.0375 (0.1396) 
Valencian Community -1.5626 (0.1671)*** -1.5075 (0.1850)*** 3.0701 (0.1474)*** 
Political variables    
PSOE -0.0264 (0.0595) 0.0617 (0.0783) -0.0353 (0.0711) 
PP 0.0022 (0.0607) 0.0316 (0.0810) -0.0338 (0.0721) 
Majority -0.0950 (0.0482)** -0.0480 (0.0476) 0.1430 (0.0532)*** 
Continuity 0.1101 (0.0464)** 0.0653 (0.0464) -0.1754 (0.0475)*** 
Observations 383 
Log likelihood -307.89 
Pseudo R-squared 0.245 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in brackets; *, ** and *** mean statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
  
 
 
Table 6 – Falsification tests. Multinomial regressions with placebo 
reforms: Estimated marginal effects for Aqualia, 1984-2016. 
 Aqualia 
Real reform variables  
PSOE*Reform 2007 -0.0899 (0.0806) 
PP*Reform 2007 -0.1417 (0.0825)* 
Selected placebo variables  
PSOE*Reform 2000 -0.0143 (0.0860) 
PP*Reform 2000 -0.0096 (0.1018) 
PSOE*Reform 2003 0.0087 (0.0807) 
PP*Reform 2003 -0.0561 (0.0874) 
PSOE*Reform 2005 -0.0253 (0.0789) 
PP*Reform 2005 -0.0787 (0.0828) 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in brackets; * and ** mean 
statistical significance at 10 and 5 percent, respectively. 
  
 
 
Table 7 – Multinomial logistic regression: Year fixed estimated marginal effects 1984-2016. 
 Aqualia Agbar Others 
Selected year fixed effects    
2001 0.1684 (0.1024)* 0.2219 (0.1228)* -0.3904 (0.1370)*** 
2002 0.1579 (0.0904)* 0.2024 (0.1086)* -0.3604 (0.1010)*** 
2003 0.2005 (0.1001)** 0.0739 (0.1188) -0.2744 (0.1037)*** 
2004 -0.0313 (0.0972) 0.2522 (0.1078)** -0.2209 (0.0869)*** 
2005 -0.0135 (0.1014) 0.2084 (0.1135)* -0.1949 (0.1126)* 
2006 -0.1659 (0.0976)* 0.1826 (0.1107)* -0.0167 (0.0888) 
2008 -0.4392 (0.1812)** 0.3347 (0.1264)*** 0.1044 (0.1074) 
2009 -0.1363 (0.0804)* 0.2433 (0.0914)*** -0.1069 (0.0753) 
2010 0.0523 (0.0732) 0.0161 (0.0939) -0.0684 (0.0737) 
2011 0.0281 (0.0833) -0.0188 (0.1032) -0.0092 (0.0807) 
2012 -0.1511 (0.0839)* 0.1471 (0.0986) 0.0039 (0.0780) 
2013 -0.0906 (0.0840) 0.0339 (0.1002) 0.0567 (0.0772) 
Political variables    
PSOE 0.0678 (0.0495) -0.0907 (0.0506)* 0.0229 (0.0498) 
PP 0.1125 (0.0577)* -0.1326 (0.0602)** 0.0200 (0.0584) 
PSOE*Reform 2007 -0.0583 (0.0702) 0.0809 (0.0735) -0.0226 (0.0676) 
PP*Reform 2007 -0.0616 (0.0719) 0.0487 (0.0768) 0.0128 (0.0695) 
Majority -0.0542 (0.0314)* -0.0178 (0.0314) 0.0721 (0.0317)** 
Continuity 0.0405 (0.0317) 0.0364 (0.0317) -0.0769 (0.0287)*** 
Observations 922 
Log likelihood -772.92 
Pseudo R-squared 0.236 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in brackets; *, ** and *** mean statistical significance 
at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. This model also includes regional fixed effects and control 
variables population and economic activity, as well as the rest of the year fixed effects, which are 
not displayed in the Table. 
 
 
Appendix – Variables: Description and sources. 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variable   
Firm awarded the contract in the 
privatization contest 
Name of the firm to which the contract to manage the urban water 
service is awarded: either Aqualia (1), Agbar (2) or Others (3) 
Own elaboration 
Policy variable   
Reform 2007 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for privatizations occurring 
before the passing of Organic Law 8/2007 and Law 30/2007, 
regarding the financing of political parties and procurement of 
public contracts, respectively; and 0 otherwise 
Own elaboration 
Market variables   
Population Number of inhabitants in the municipality Spanish Statistical Office (INE) 
Economic activity Indicator of economic activity computed at the municipal level using 
information from the Spanish Business Activities Tax (IAE in its 
Spanish acronym) 
 
La Caixa (2014) 
Regional variables 16 geographical dummy variables that take the value 1 if the 
municipality belongs to the regions of Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, 
Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La 
Mancha, Castile and Leon, Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid, 
Murcia, La Rioja and the Valencian Community, respectively; and 0 
otherwise 
Own elaboration 
  
 
 
Variables: description and sources. Continued. 
Variable Description Source 
Political variables   
PSOE Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the left-wing Spanish 
Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE in its Spanish acronym) was in 
power at the time of privatization; and 0 otherwise 
Spanish Ministry of Finance 
and Public Administration 
PP Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the right-wing Popular 
Party (PP in its Spanish acronym) was in power at the time of 
privatization; and 0 otherwise 
Spanish Ministry of Finance 
and Public Administration 
Majority Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the party in power held a 
majority when the decision to privatize was taken; and 0 otherwise. 
This variable is defined by the number of city councilors 
Spanish Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
Continuity Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the decision to privatize 
was taken in the second or a subsequent term of office of the party 
ruling the town council; and 0 otherwise 
Spanish Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
 
